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Abstract
This paper extends an anaylsis proposed by Hirota (1981) to a class of economies with
C.E.S. utility functions that include Scarf (1960)'s second example as a special case and
shows by the use of numerical methodsthat (i) a Walrasian price adjustment mechanism
converges to an equilibrium with very high probability and (ii) the weak axiom in revealed
preference for market excess demands is satised with high probability, but the gross
substitutability is rarely satised. Also, this paper suggests a possible interpretation of
a Walrasian price adjustment that is based on the observations of experiments done by
Anderson, Plott, Shimomura and Granat (2000).
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1 Introduction
The problem of stability of the competitive equilibrium was intensively dis-
cussed in the 1950’s by Arrow and Hurwicz (1958), Arrow, Block and Hurwicz
(1959), and many others: the most important result was that global stability
occurs if all of the goods are gross substitutes, though the plausibility of such
condition has been left still unclear. It was finally settled by Scarf (1960)’s
demonstration of the counter examples to the conjecture that the Walrasian
price adjustment mechanism was always stable: Scarf provided two examples,
the first with Leontief type utility function, the second with C.E.S. utility func-
tion. From those instability examples of Scarf and subsequent analyses of mar-
ket excess demands studied by Sonnenschein, Mantel, Debreu, and others, it is
widely held that the phenomenon of instability of the competitive equilibrium
will be relatively common. This recognition naturally led to the study of ad-
vanced mathematical techniques (see Scarf (1973)) for computing an equilibrium
instead of a simple price adjustment that seems to have become an old-fashion
method.
Twenty years ago, the author (1981) asked whether or not the instability
of Scarf’s first example is robust against changes in the assignment of initial
holdings and clarified that global stability returns for about 80 percent of all
assignment patterns. Additionally Hirota (1985) extended this analysis to a
class of economies with arbitrary utility functions which include the perfect
complementarity of Scarf’s example as a limiting case. However, this dominancy
of global stability is asserted only in a very restricted class of economies, and
nothing was mentioned about a more general class of economies such as Scarf’s
second example with the C.E.S. utility functions that represent more reality
than types of perfect complementarity.
Recently Anderson, Plott, Shimomura and Granat (2000) have applied a
model of Scarf’s first example to the experimental study of double auction mar-
kets2 and have observed very remarkable facts: the stream of the average prices
1 I would like to thank Peter Bossaerts, Charles Plott, and other faculties at Caltech for
a number of stimulating discussions. In particular, I am grateful to Charles Plott for his
suggestions in this version.
2There is an experiment of multiple tatonnement market system (diﬀerent from double
auction market) proposed by Plott (1988). He demonstrated that due to the lack of incentive
compatibility, such system never converged in the sense that the system iterated without ever
receiving quantities demanded and supplied that would allow the system to stop at the price.
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of the actual transaction prices roughly follows the solution paths of a taton-
nement process. That is, when the solutions oscillate without tending to con-
verge, the data show the same motion, and when the solutions converge to the
equilibrium, the data also show such convergence. Their results may suggest a
possible interpretation of a Walrasian price adjustment which is quite diﬀerent
from the common one (for example, see Hicks (1989; pp.7-11)) and might have
been partially close to the final intention of Walras (1873; pp.83-91, 153-172):
Walras states that the actual, well organized markets close to his theoretical,
frictionless, competitive markets are those of the stock exchange, the grain, etc.
in which purchases and sales are made by auction (as buyers, the traders make
their demands by outbidding each other, and as sellers, the traders make their
oﬀers by underbidding each other). Although Walras does not succeed to pre-
cisely describe the dynamic complexity of disequilibrium transaction prices in
such markets, he seems to consider or at least to intend that as time proceeds,
the stream of complex transaction prices, through the mechanism of free com-
petition, will gravitate to a general equilibrium, and its motion of prices may
to some extent be represented by his successive tatonnement process. (as to
an experimental study of a traditional adjustment process that is diﬀerent from
the Walrasian one, see Plott and George (1992).)
Motivated by the above, in this paper we extend an analysis proposed by
Hirota (1981) to a class of economies with the C.E.S. utility functions that
include Scarf’s second example as a special case and show by the use of numerical
method that the diﬀerential equations representing a simple price adjustment
process converge to an equilibrium point with very high probability. In addition,
we explore to what extent the above class of economies will satisfy the important
stability conditions such as the gross substitutability and the weak axiom in
revealed preference for market excess demands and show that the weak axiom
is satisfied with high probability, but the gross substitutability is rarely satisfied.
This explore seems to be important because there is nothing in the literature
so far which enables us to see how those conditions will be plausible not only in
theory but in practice.
The meaning of this study developed here is as follows:
(1) As long as the C.E.S. utility functions often used in empirical studies are sup-
posed, the phenomenon of stability will be considered to be common, contrary
to the conventional understanding (see Negishi (1962)) that is widely held. As
Scarf (1981) states in comment on Hirota (1981), a simple tatonnement process
may be still useful in practice as an algorithm for computing an equilibrium
because it may converge with high probability.
(2) The gross substitutability has very few possibility to be satisfied, so that
many assertions based on this assumption have to be reconsidered. On the
other hand, the probability that the weak axiom is satisfied will be very high
and considerably close to that of stability. This fact means that the market
excess demands may be highly probable to be well behaved functions which
bring about fruitful results in theory.
(3) If, as Anderson, Plott, Shimomura and Granat show and Walras might
have considered, the Walrasian price adjustment could describe, as a general
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tendency, the direction of the motion of the transaction prices in well organized
markets, our study here would give an indication of the extent to which the
competitive equilibrium in theory may be prevalent in some reality.
2 Model and Specific Space of Parameters
Let us consider an exchange economy with three commodities and three
individuals each of whose utility functions is assumed to be of the form
U(x1, x2, x3) = [b
ρ+1
1 ·x−ρ1 + bρ+12 ·x−ρ2 + bρ+13 ·x−ρ3 ]−
1
ρ (1)
The parameters (b1, b2, b3) ≥ 0 and ρ ≥ 0 respectively denote the relative
importance among goods and the degree of substitutability among goods, and
1/(1 + ρ) = c is called “elasticity of substitution.” It should be noted that
as c → 0, (1) becomes Min[x1/b1, x2/b2, x3/b3], and as c = 1, (1) becomes the
Cobb-Douglas function.
Since, in our analysis, the parameters (b1, b2, b3) for all individuals are ran-
domly chosen from a parameter space we are about to give, we shall represent
them as bj = (bj1, bj2, bj3)’s, where the first subscript refers to the person and
the second to the commodity. In order to avoid the complexity of description
let us assume that a value of c is common for all the individuals (even if dif-
ferent values are supposed, the results studied below do not change). Also let
the initial endowments of all individuals be represented by aj = (aj1, aj2, aj3)’s
that will be randomly chosen from a certain space.
When given all the parameters, for any prices p = (p1, p2, p3) > 0 the excess
demands of each individual are derived from utility maximization subject to
the budget constraint, and summing these up, we obtain the following market
excess demand functions that are defined parametrically:
fi(p; a, b, c) =
3X
j=1
"
bji·p−ci ·MjP3
k=1 bjk·p1−ck
− aji
#
, i = 1, 2, 3, (2)
where Mj ≡
P
piaji is the nominal income of the jth individual, both a =
(a1, a2, a3) and b =
¡
b1, b2, b3
¢
are points in nine-dimensional real space. (2)
is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to p and b, and is homogeneous of
degree one with respect to a.
Now consider a simple price adjustment process in which the rate of change
of price of each commodity is assumed to be simply equal to the excess demand
of that commodity (for simplicity we are neglecting the problem of adjustment
speed). Mathematically this is given by the following parametric diﬀerential
equations:
4
dpi
dt
= fi(p; a, b, c), i = 1, 2, 3. (3)
If we take the initial prices p (0) > 0 on the sphere
P3
i=1 p
2
i ≡ λ > 0, then the
solution p[t; p (0)] to (3) will always be on that sphere as long as the existence
is assured, since
P
pi
dpi
dt =
P
pifi ≡ 0 by the Walras Law.
In this section a restriction is put on the parameters aj ’s and bj ’s that enables
a study of the concern at hand in close relation to the past works of Scarf (1960)
and Hirota (1981).
Let A =


a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33

 and B =


b11 b12 b13
b21 b22 b23
b31 b32 b33

 ,
where the former is called the endowment matrix and the latter the evaluation
matrix.
Assumption 1 A and B are doubly stochastic, i.e.,
3X
i=1
aji = 1, (j = 1, 2, 3) ,
3X
j=1
aji = 1, (i = 1, 2, 3), (4)
3X
i=1
bji = 1, (j = 1, 2, 3) ,
3X
j=1
bji = 1, (i = 1, 2, 3). (5)
When p∗ = (1, 1, 1) or its multiples prevail, the supply of each commodity
and the income of each trader do not change for any a =
¡
a1, a2, a3
¢
satisfying
(4), and the total demand for each commodity is unity for any b = (b1, b2, b3)
satisfying (5), so that p∗ = (1, 1, 1) and its multiples are always an equilibrium.
Of course some other equilibrium prices may emerge depending on the para-
meters chosen. Since the multiples of (5) do not change the demand functions,
throughout this paper let us consider they also belong to a class of Assumption
1.
Before proceeding further, a short review of the past works seems useful for
understanding the intention here. Taken here is a special case of parameters
that are given by cyclic permutations of goods:
A =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

 and B =


0 α 1
1 0 α
α 1 0

 . (6)
The famous instability examples of Scarf may now be described as the following
cases: In addition to (6), α and c satisfy either
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α = 1 and c = 0 (7)
or
α >
1
1− 2c and
1
2
> c > 0. (8)
Case (7) corresponds to Scarf’s first example in which each trader always de-
mands the same quantity of only two goods and initially has a single unit of
either good. On the other hand, case (8) corresponds to his second example in
which a C.E.S. utility function having more reality is adopted; the indiﬀerence
curves of both examples are of the forms in figure 1.
Figure 1:
Scarf (1960) showed the following: For the initial price vector p (0) such
that
P
p2i ≡ 3, case (7) yields that the solutions of system (3) are subject
to a limit cycle that is explicitly determined as the intersection of p1·p2·p3 =
p1 (0) ·p2 (0) ·p3 (0) and the sphere
P
p2i ≡ 3, and case (8) yields that the solu-
tions move away from the equilibrium p∗ = (1, 1, 1) and approach some limit
cycle that does not contain p∗. As Scarf states, the property of instability in
the second example does not depend on a delicate change of parameters as long
as (8) is satisfied. However, when given diﬀerent assignments of initial holdings
such as a1 = (1, 0, 0), a2 = (0, 1, 0), a3 = (0, 0, 1), global stability returns for
both cases (7) and (8).
Let us consider a four-dimensional real set Y (soon defined) satisfying (4),
and define the stable set G ⊂ Y, each point of which leads to global stability of
system (3) with case (7). Hirota (1981) showed that the ratio of measure G to
measure Y is equal to 3/2− log 2, approximately 0.8. Since the stable set is this
much, such complementarity as Scarf’s alone cannot stem the stable function of
the tatonnement processes, permitting the assertion that special assignments of
initial holdings may be responsible for the instability of Scarf’s first example.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the above results to a more general
class of parameters a, b, and c that includes Scarf’s second example, but to
do this following the mathematical method of Hirota (1981) seems extremely
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diﬃcult. So in this paper the purpose is achieved by the use of a numerical
method based on computer programs.
Now turning to describe the study here, Assumption 1 naturally leads to a
four-dimensional real space as follows:
Y = {y = (y11, y12, y21, y22) ∈ R4+ | 1 = yi1 + yi2 (i = 1, 2) (9)
1 = y1i + y2i (i = 1, 2)
y11 + y12 + y21 + y22 = 1}.
Next are considered a space of “lattice points” included in Y ,
eY (n) = ½µ i
n
,
j
n
,
k
n
,
r
n
¶
∈ Y
¾
, (10)
where n is a positive integer, and integers (i, j, k, r) are nonnegative integers
less than or equal to n. The region of points in eY (n) may be demonstrated by
Figure 2, which may help in making a program of system (3).
Figure 2:
When eY (n) is concerned with the initial endowments, it will be written as
C (n) , and on the other hand when concerned with the evaluation parameters
in utility functions, it will be written as Q (m) . Of course, n and m are positive
integers.
Definition 1 (stable set of initial endowments)
For a given eb = (b11, b12, b21, b22) ∈ Q (m) and a given c, a set G (b, c) ⊂
C (n) is defined, each point of which leads to global stability of system (3) in the
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following sense: The solutions to (3) with the initial price vector p (0) satisfyingP
p2i ≡ 3 converge close enough to the equilibrium prices p∗ = (1, 1, 1), i.e.,
| p (t; p (0))−p∗|< ε, where ε is a suﬃciently small positive number.
Definition 2 (probability of global stability)
Let us assume that points of C(n) and Q (m) independently occur with equal
frequency. In other words, they are randomly chosen from C (n) and Q (m). (I)
For a given eb ∈ Q (m) and a given c, the ratio of the number of points in G (b, c)
to the number of points in C (n) implies a “conditional probability” of the system
(3) being globally stable, written as
P (b, c)=
#G (b, c)
#C (n)
, (11)
where #C denotes the number of points in C. (II) A conditional probability
may be defined for all points in Q (m), so that its average implies the “total”
probability of system (3) being globally stable. Formally,
P (c)=
Peb∈Q P (b, c)
#Q (m)
. (12)
The computer simulation based on the programs mainly written with For-
tran tells what values the above P (b, c) and P (c) actually take. (In this pro-
gram the Runge-Kutta method and the Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg method have
been adopted. Since the programs with Fortran are too long to demonstrate,
simple examples of program written with Mathematica will be instead given in
Appendix.) It is conceivable that these values will depend on the size of the
lattice space considered, i.e. actually on the given values of n and m. However,
numerical studies show that for n and m larger than some value the above prob-
ability does not change very much. Thus the aim here will be achieved only if
suitable values of n and m are tried.
Throughout the computer operations in this section a convergence measure
ε = 0.001 and an initial price vector (for example, p (0) =
³
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
q
5
2
´
) that is
far from the equilibrium p∗ = (1, 1, 1) were given. Below lies a demonstration of
the typical results obtained. In order to determine the sizes of two lattice spaces
C (n), Q (m) , in (I),(II) and (III) n = 30 was set, so that #C (30) = 123256,
and in (IV) n = 20 and m = 6 were set, so that #C ·#Q = 10879176.
(I) When b1 = (0, 1, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 1) , b3 = (1, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is:
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P (b, c) =
123256
#C
= 1 for c = 0.4
=
123232
#C
= 0.999 for c = 0.3
=
116000
#C
= 0.941 for c = 0.1
=
103660
#C
= 0.841 for c = 0
(This data reconfirm the theorem in Hirota (1985).)
(II) When b1 = (0, 6, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 6) , b3 = (6, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is seen in:
P (b, c) =
123193
#C
= 0.999 for c = 0.4
=
122382
#C
= 0.993 for c = 0.2
=
121383
#C
= 0.983 for c = 0.1
=
119749
#C
= 0.972 for c = 0
(It should be noted that condition (8) is satisfied for c ≤ 0.4. Therefore this case
corresponds to the utility functions in Scarf’s second example.)
(III) When b1 = (6, 3, 1) , b2 = (3, 1, 6) , b3 = (1, 6, 3) , the conditional probabil-
ity is seen in:
P (b, c) =
123256
#C
= 1 for c = 0.4
=
121541
#C
= 0.990 for c = 0.2
=
110767
#C
= 0.900 for c = 0.1
=
86856
#C
= 0.704 for c = 0
(IV) Finally, the total probability is seen in :
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P (c) =
10875657
#C ·#Q = 0.999 for c = 0.4
=
10800291
#C ·#Q = 0.993 for c = 0.2
=
10320058
#C ·#Q = 0.949 for c = 0.1
=
6409691
#C ·#Q = 0.589 for c = 0
The data above show that it will be highly probable, except for c = 0, that
system (3) with a class of parameters satisfying Assumption 1 converges to the
equilibrium p∗ = (1, 1, 1) , and that in eﬀect the equations of fi (p; a, b, c) = 0
(i = 1, 2, 3) have a unique equilibrium. It is also noted that for c larger than
0.5, these probabilities become almost unity.
3 Gross Substitutes and Weak Axiom
It was seen in the previous section that the phenomenon of stability dom-
inates system (3). In this section, by asking to what extent the well known
stability conditions such as gross substitutability and weak axiom would be
satisfied within the framework of system (2) with Assumption 1, we want to
compare the results of both the previous and the present sections. This study
clarifies how ad hoc presumptions imposed on excess demands will be applicable
not only in theory but in practice.
The condition of gross substitutes is that the Jacobian of the excess demands
f1, f2, f3 has all of the oﬀ-diagonal elements being positive for all p ≥ 0, i.e.,
∂fi
∂pj
> 0 if i 6= j (13)
(“weak” gross substitutes in which some inequalities are permitted equal to zero
is neglected in this paper.)
(13) yields the weak axiom in revealed preference for market excess demand
functions ( see Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959)), that is, p∗ · f(p; a, b, c) > 0
for all p 6= p∗ (an equilibrium price vector), which , under Assumption 1, is
reduced to
3X
i=1
fi(p; a, b, c) > 0 for p 6= p∗ (14)
since all goods are able to have an identical prices at equilibrium. (It is to be
noted that (13) is suﬃcient for (14), but not necessary.)
Let prices be taken on the interior of unit simplex, which leads to use a set
S = {0 < p1 + p2 < 1, pi > 0}.
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(No case with zero price is dealt with because our excess demand functions are
defined only on the positive orthant.)
In order to try numerical study let us define a lattice set of S,
eS(h) = ½µ i
h
,
j
h
¶
∈ S
¾
,
where h is a positive integer giving the size of a space of lattice points, and
integers(i, j) are positive integers less than h.
When parameters eb ∈ Q(m) and c are given, by the computer simulation
based on the programs written with Fortran, we can define two subsets of C(n)
for one set of which the excess demands fi(p; a, b, c)’s satisfy (13) for all points ofeS(h) with a suﬃciently large h and for another set of which the excess demands
satisfy (14), and then similarly as in the previous section we can also define
these probabilities. It should be noticed that since only finite points of S are
examined in numerical studies, the “true”probability (should be defined for all
points of S) must be somewhat less than the one in the consideration here.
However, if a suitable size of eS(h) is taken into consideration, its diﬀerences will
be expected a very little.
(probability of gross substitutes) At first let us demonstrate typical results
on gross substitutability that are obtained by the program with Fortran. (Simple
example of the program with Mathematica will be given in Appendix.) To
determine the sizes of three lattice spaces C (n) , Q (m) , eS (h) , n = 30 and h =
10 were set in (I),(II),(III), so that #C = 123256,and n = 20,m = 10, h = 10
were set in (IV), so that #C ·#Q = 59245956.
(I) When b1 = (0, 1, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 1) , b3 = (1, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is seen in:
P (b, c) =
98200
#C
= 0.796 for c = 0.9
=
29162
#C
= 0.236 for c = 0.8
=
121
#C
= 0.001 for c = 0.6
(II) When b1 = (0, 6, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 6) , b3 = (6, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is seen in:
P (b, c) =
105386
#C
= 0.855 for c = 0.9
=
36590
#C
= 0.296 for c = 0.7
=
69
#C
= 0.001 for c = 0.4
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(III) When b1 = (6, 3, 1) , b2 = (3, 1, 6) , b3 = (1, 6, 3) , the conditional probability
is seen in:
P (b, c) =
121397
#C
= 0.984 for c = 0.9
=
13907
#C
= 0.113 for c = 0.7
=
746
#C
= 0.006 for c = 0.6
(IV) Finally, the total probability is as follows:
P (c) =
53906161
#C ·#Q = 0.909 for c = 0.9
=
9704706
#C ·#Q = 0.164 for c = 0.7
=
366649
#C ·#Q = 0.006 for c = 0.5
The numerical study tells : in addition to the above data, for any c less than
0.5 the probabilty is almost equal to zero, so that the gross substitutability,
except when the elasticity of substitution is close enough to unity, cannot be
expected to dominate system (2) with Assumption 1. It seems, therefore, that
this condition is too stringent to impose on the market excess demands.
(probability of weak axiom) What happens to the weak axiom? An answer
lies in a demonstration below. In (I),(II),(III), n = 30, h = 20 or h = 40 or
h = 80 were set, so that #C = 123256,and in (IV) n = 10,m = 10 and h = 30
were set, so that #C ·#Q = 59245956.
(I) When b1 = (0, 1, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 1) , b3 = (1, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is as follows:
P (b, c) =
123256
#C
= 1 for c = 0.4
=
122072
#C
= 0.990 for c = 0.2
=
113808
#C
= 0.923 for c = 0.1
=
80935
#C
= 0.656 for c = 0
(II) When b1 = (0, 6, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 6) , b3 = (6, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is seen in:
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P (b, c) =
122818
#C
= 0.996 for c = 0.3
=
120954
#C
= 0.981 for c = 0.1
=
118106
#C
= 0.958 for c = 0
(III) When b1 = (6, 3, 1) , b2 = (3, 1, 6) , b3 = (1, 6, 3) , the conditional probability
is seen in:
P (b, c) =
123238
#C
= 0.999 for c = 0.3
=
120775
#C
= 0.980 for c = 0.2
=
107231
#C
= 0.870 for c = 0.1
=
74102
#C
= 0.601 for c = 0
(IV) Finally the total probability is as follows:
P (c) =
59171907
#C ·#Q = 0.998 for c = 0.3
=
58491774
#C ·#Q = 0.988 for c = 0.2
=
53488875
#C ·#Q = 0.902 for c = 0.1
=
29079035
#C ·#Q = 0.491 for c = 0
The data say that the weak axiom will be satisfied with high probability,
except for zero value of elasticity of substitution (put diﬀerently, the substitution
terms in the Slusky equation vanish). Suprisingly, the above result is very close
to the one of the previous section. This suggests that the weak axiom may
be not only a suﬃcient condition for global stability, but considerably near the
necessary condition. Of course it will be uncertain whether this may be asserted
under more general framework beyond C.E.S. preferences.
4 General Space of Parameters and Remarks
In the previous section it was shown that the phenomenon of stability dom-
inates system (3) when the parameters satisfy Assumption 1. Although the
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change on the measure of quantity of goods covers for some more possible cases
of parameters, it is not suﬃcient. Therefore in this section it is desirable to
study what will happen to the completely general class of parameters.
Put forth are the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 The sum of all elements in the endowment matrix A is
unity, and the sum of each row and column in A is positive, i.e.,
3X
j=1
3X
i=1
aji = 1, (15)
3X
i=1
aji > 0 (j = 1, 2, 3) , (16)
3X
j=1
aji > 0 (i = 1, 2, 3) . (17)
(16) implies that each person initially possesses at least one commodity, and
(17) implies that each commodity is supplied by at least one person.
Assumption 3 The sum of each row in the evaluation matrix B is unity,
and at least two elements of each row are positive, and the sum of each column
is positive, i.e.,
3X
i=1
bji = 1 (j = 1, 2, 3) , (18)
bji < 1 (i, j = 1, 2, 3) , (19)
3X
j=1
bji > 0. (20)
Now let the implication of these assumptions be explained. Since the market
excess demand functions f = (f1, f2, f3) are homogeneous of degree one with
respect to a =
¡
a1, a2, a3
¢
∈ R9, for any positive scalar λ > 0, f (p;λa, b, c) =
λ·f(p; a, b, c). Suppose system (3) with (a, b, c) is globally stable. Then there
is a Liapunov function V (p) , that is again a Liapunov function for system (3)
with (λa, b, c) , since
V˙ (p) =
P ∂V
∂pi ·p˙i =
P ∂V
∂pi ·fi (p;λa, b, c)
= λ
P ∂V
∂pi ·fi (p; a, b, c) .
Because the demand functions do not change for multiples of bj , (16) is com-
pletely general.
Though a =
¡
a1, a2, a3
¢
is a point of the nine-dimensional real space, a
restriction of Assumption 2 leads to the consideration of an eight-dimensional
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space by elimination one variable, a33. Let this real space be denoted by Y and
a lattice space of Y be defined as follows:
bC (n) = {ba = ¡a1, a2, a31, a32¢ = ¡ in , jn , kn¢ ∈ Y },
where i = (i1, i2, i3) , j = (j1, j2, j3) , k = (k1, k2) are all nonnegative integers
less than or equal to a given n.
On the other hand, Assumption 3 leads to a six-dimensional real space Z
that is expressed as three time products of {z1 + z2 5 1, zi ≥ 0}. Let us define
a lattice space of Z as follows :
bQ (m) = {bb = (b11, b12, b21, b22, b31, b32) = ¡ im , jm , km¢ ∈ Z},
where i = (i1, i2) , j = (j1, j2) , k = (k1, k2) are all nonnegative integers less
than or equal to a given integer m.
If ba and bb are independently taken from the above sets, then an identical
equilibrium price cannot be supposed as was done in the previous sections.
However it is possible, without loss of generality, to change the measurement of
each good so as to obtain an identical equilibrium price. Let fi (p) be an excess
demand function of the jth good, and p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) an equilibrium price
vector on the unit simplex. Measuring one unit of each good as p∗i unit provides
the new excess demand funcitons that are defined as
gi (q1, q2, q3) = p
∗
i · fi (q1p∗1, q2p∗2, q3p∗3) , i = 1, 2, 3,
where q is price vector in new measurment and again on the unit simplex.
It is quite clear that q1 = q2 = q3 gives an equilibrium prices for the
new excess demands, and gi (q)’s satisfy the weak axiom if and only if fi (p)’s
satisfy. It is also clear that if one system is globally stable, so is another
system : a Liapunov function V (p) for the former system yields V ∗ (q) =
V (q1/p
∗
1, q2/p
∗
2, q3/p
∗
3) that is a Liapunov function for the latter system.
These facts enable us to concentrate on some specifie distributions of pair
(a, b)’s for which the equilibrium prices of all goods are always the same ; both
p1 = p2 = p3 and f (p; a, b, c) = 0 yield
3X
j=1
bji
3X
k=1
ajk −
3X
j=1
aji = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, (21)
only two of which are independent by the Walras Law.
For a given bb ∈ bQ(m), a set of initial endowments eC(n,bb) ⊂ bC(n) can be
defined so as to satisfy (21), and two subsets of eC(n,bb) can be defined each point
of whose one set leads to stability, and each point of whose another set leads to
the weak axiom, and furthermore these probabilities can be defined similarly as
in sections 2 and 3.
Below are demonstrated typical results under this completely general setting
of parameters, which are given by the computer simulation based on the program
with Fortran.
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(probability of weak axiom) In order to determine the sizes of three lattice
spaces, in (I) n = 39 and h = 30 were, set so that # eC ³39,bb´ = 260517,in
(II) and (III) n = 60 and h = 30 were set, so that # eC ³60,bb´ = 199196 and
111090 respectively, and in (IV) n = 15,m = 9 and h = 20 were set, so that
# eC ·# bQ = 17782875.
(I) When b1 = (0, 1, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 1) , b3 = (1, 1, 0) , the conditional probability
is:
P (b, c) =
258776
# eC = 0.993 for c = 0.2
=
237411
# eC = 0.911 for c = 0.1
=
136899
# eC = 0.525 for c = 0
(II) When b1 = (0, 6, 1) , b2 = (1, 0, 6) , b3 = (6, 1, 0) ,the probability is seen in:
P (b, c) =
199061
# eC = 0.999 for c = 0.4
=
196281
# eC = 0.985 for c = 0.2
=
181785
# eC = 0.913 for c = 0
(III) When b1 = (6, 3, 1) , b2 = (3, 1, 6) , b3 = (1, 6, 3) , the probability is seen in:
P (b, c) =
109005
# eC = 0.981 for c = 0.2
=
94584
# eC = 0.851 for c = 0.1
=
58356
# eC = 0.525 for c = 0
(IV) Finally, the total probability is as follows:
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P (c) =
17730771
# eC ·# bQ = 0.997 for c = 0.4
=
16840818
# eC ·# bQ = 0.947 for c = 0.2
=
13831998
# eC ·# bQ = 0.778 for c = 0.1
=
5408884
# eC ·# bQ = 0.304 for c = 0
The above data show that the probability of weak axiom is again very high
even in this completely general parameters, except for zero value of elasticity of
substitution. The weak axiom is not necessarily required to obtain stability (it
is just a suﬃcient condition), so that the probability of stability in this general
setting will be expected to be somewhat larger than the above data. The
numerical data about stability in this case (which are not demonstrated here)
tell us: when the elasticity of substitution is larger than 0.2, the diﬀerence of
both probabilities is very small, but when it is 0.1 and ,in particular, 0, there
appears some diﬀerence of about 10 percent.
It seems that the data observed in sections 2 and 3 and the present section
may permit this concluding assertion:
Proposition When the C.E.S. utility functions with the “positivity” of elas-
ticity of substitution are assumed, system (3) converges to an equilibrium with
very high probability, and system (2) satisfies the weak axiom with high proba-
bility and rarely satisfies the gross substitutability if the elasticity of substitution
is not close enough to unity.
It is noted from the data that as the value of elasticity of substitution be-
comes larger (in other words, as the substitution eﬀect in the Slusky equation
becomes larger), the degree of stability increases. This seems to support the
traditional view (see Hicks (1939; pp.315-317)) that the source of instability is
due to asymmetrical income eﬀects in markets and the substitution eﬀects have
the eﬀect of stabilizing the economic system.
Finally, some remarks on the characteristics of market excess demand func-
tions and on an interpretation of a Walrasian price adjustment process.
(I) It is widely held that since an arbitrary market excess demands satisfying
the homogeneity and the Walras Law can be decomposed into a number of
individual excess demand functions that are supported by utility maximization
behavior, it will be disagreeable to impose specific conditions on market excess
demands. However our research here may suggest that as long as C.E.S. utility
functions are assumed, a class of excess demands that defy a nice property will
be rarely met in practice and will have relatively a only small measure.
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(II) Consider an exchange economy that is characterized by U j (xj1, xj2, xj3) ,
aj = (aj1, aj2, aj3) , j = 1, 2, 3, where U j (·) and aj denote the jth type trader’s
utility function and initial endowment vector. Further suppose:
(i) There are N people in each type.
(ii) This economy is stationary for certain periods from period 1 to period eT ,
that is, in all periods every person has the same utility function and initial
endowments as in the first period.
(iii) All the transactions are performed subject to some rules of double auction
markets (for instance, see Davis and Holt (1993)), and are performed through
numeraire (consider the third commodity to be numeraire). As buyers, the
traders make their demands (either exact quantities or some range of quanti-
ties) by outbidding each other, and as sellers, the traders make their oﬀers by
underbidding each other.
Let pbi (τ , T ) and p
0
i (τ , T ) denote the bid price and oﬀer price of commodity
i at a time τ in period T, i.e., Gi (T ) = {pbi (τ , T ) , p0i (τ , T )}, i = 1, 2.
The set of the actual transaction prices Si (T ) = {pai (τ , T )} will be a subset
of Gi (T ) . Gi and Si will be regulated by utility functions, initial holdings, his-
tory of the past data, and various expectations. However, it seems extremely
diﬃcult to represent the motion of all the prices in each period by some diﬀer-
ential equations since it involves a sort of complexity.
In their several experiments, Anderson, Plott, Shimomura and Granat (2000)
have observed the following: When such a perfect complementarity as Scarf’s
is assumed, and types of assignment patterns of initial holdings are given, the
stream of the average transaction prices in each period
n
pi (1) , pi (2) , ...,pi
³eT´o
roughly follows the prediction of the solution paths of Walrasian tatonnement
process. This observation may yield some conjectures that seem to be very
stimulating for future research:
(i) The average trader of each type may be considered the price taker.
(ii) The average transaction prices in each period may be approximately de-
termined as the average transaction prices in the previous period plus some
estimated value of the excess demand in the previous period, i.e.,
pi (T + 1) = pi (T ) + ϕ(excess demand of commodity i) + ², i = 1, 2.
This price movements (which, at a glance, look like a tatonnement) may ap-
proximately represent the dynamics of the average prices of many complex dis-
equilibrium prices at which the various transactions are actually performed.
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Appendix
The numerical study in this paper has been performed by computer simu-
lation based on the programs that are written mainly with Fortran. For the
interested readers the use of Fortran will be highly recommended in various rea-
sons, but the Fortran programs in this research are too long to demonstrate in
this appendix, so that for the reference of the readers very simple examples of
programs for Sections 2 and 3 written with Mathematica are provided. Since
the program for Section 4 can be similarly made, it will be omitted.
(A-1) Program for Stability
The program for demonstrating whether or not system (3) with parameters a
and b and c converges to p∗ = (1, 1, 1) is as follows:
process[a_, b_, c_] := Module[{sol}, sol = NDSolve[Join[Table[p[k]’[t] ==
Sum[(b[[j, k]] Sum[p[i][t] a[[j, i]], {i, 3}] p[k][t] ^-c)/(Sum[b[[j, i]]
p[i][t]^(1-c), {i, 3}])- a[[j, k]], {k, 3}], {p[1][0] == p[2][0] == 1/2, p[3][0]
==
p
5/2}], {p[1], p[2], p[3]},{t, 0, 100}, MaxSteps -> 20000] ;
If[Sqrt[Sum[(First[p[i][100]/.sol] - 1.0)^2, {i, 3}]] < 0.001, s1 =s1 + 1,
s2 =s2 +1 ]]
When both the evaluation matrix b and elasticity of substitution c are given
and the size of the lattice space C (n) is also given the program for conditional
probability is as follows:
proba[b0_, c0_, n_] := ( b = b0; c = c0; Do[process[{{i/n, j/n, 1 - (i+j)/n},
{k/n, r/n,1 - (k+r)/n}, {1 - (i+k)/n, 1 -(j+r)/n, (i+j+k+r)/n - 1}}, b, c],
{i, 0, n}, {j, 0, n-1},{k, 0, n-i}, {r, Max[0, n-k-i-j], Min[n-k, n-j]} ;
{s1, s2})
Finally, the program for the total probability is seen in:
toproba[c00_, n0_, m_] := (n = n0; c0 = c00;
Do[proba[{{i/m, j/m, 1-(i+j)/m},{k/m, r/m, 1-(k+r)/m},
{1-(i+k)/m, 1-(j+r)/m, (i+j+k+r)/m - 1}}, c0, n], {i, 0, m},
{j, 0, m-i}, {k, 0, m-i}, {r, Max[0, m-i-j-k], Min[m-k, m-j]}];
Print[{s1, s2}];Print[”probability of stability”,” ” : ”, N[s1/(s1+s2)]])
It is noted: the above program does not take the boundary problem (on the dif-
ferential equations) into consideration, so that there will appear small diﬀerences
between the results of Section 2 by Fortran program. In the above program s1
and s2 represent the numbers of stability and instability respectively. When
this program is performed, s1 and s2 should be first set zero.
(A-2) Program for Gross Substitutability
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The Jacobian of market excess demands with parameters a and b and c is pro-
grammed as follows:
g[a_, b_, c_] := (t = Outer[D, Table[Sum[(b[[j, k]] Sum[p[i] a[[j, i]], {i, 3}]
p[k]^-c)/(Sum[b[[j, i]] p[i]^(1-c), {j, 3}], {k, 3}], Table[p[i], {i, 3}]];
Flatten[t /. Table[t[[i, i]] ->- t[[i, i]], {i, 3}]])
The program for examining whether or not excess demands (2) with parameters
a and b and c satisfy the condition of gross substitutes is as follows:
gross[a0_, b0_, c0_, h_] := (a = a0; b = b0; c = c0; Module[{s}, s = 0;
Catch[Do[If [Apply[Or, Table[Less[g[a, b, c] [[k]] /.
{p[1] -> i, p[2] -> j, p[3] -> h - i - j}, 0], {k, 9}]],
Throw[s = s + 1]], {i, 1, h -2}, {j, 1, h - i -1}]];
If[s == 1, s1 = s1 +1, s2 = s2 +1]])
When both the evaluation matrix b and the elasticity of substitution c are given
and the size of the lattice space C (n) is also given the program for conditional
probability is seen in:
grossproba[b0_, c0_, h_, n_]:= (Do[gross[{{i, j, n-i-j},{k, r, n-k-r},
{n-i-k, n-j-r, (i+j+k+r) -n}}, b0, c0, h], {i, 0, n}, {j, 0, n-i}, {k, 0, n-i},
{r, Max[0, n-k-i-j], Min[n-k, n-j]}]; {s1, s2})
Finally the program for total probability is seen in:
grosstoproba[c00_, h0_,n0_, m_]:=(c0=c00; h=h0; n=n0;
Do[grossproba[{{i, j, m-i-j},{k, r, m-k-r},{m-i-k, m-j-r, (i+j+k+r)-m}},
c0, h, n], {i, 0, m},{j, 0, m-i},{k, 0, m-i},{r, Max[m-k, m-j],
Min[m-k, m-j]}]; Print[”total probability”,”:”, N[s1/(s1+s2)]])
In the above s1 and s2 respectively represent the numbers of gross substitutabil-
ity being satisfied and not satisfied
(A-3) Program for Weak Axiom
The summation of the market demands with parameters a and b and c is pro-
grammed as follows:
w[a_, b_, c_] := Sum[Sum[(b[[j, k]] Sum[p[i] a[[j, i]], {i, 3}] p[k]^-c)/
(Sum[b[[j, i]] p[i]^(1-c), {i, 3}]), {j, 3}], {k, 3}]
The program for examining whether or not the market excess demands with
parameters a and b and c satisfy the condition of weak axiom is made as follows:
weak[a0_, b0_, c0_, h_] := (a = a0; b = b0; c = c0; Module[{s}, s = 0;
Catch[Do[If [And[LessEqual[ w[a, b, c]/.
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{p[1]-> i, p[2]-> j, p[3]-> h - i -j}, 3], Unequal[3 i, h]],
Throw[s = s +1]], {i, 1, h -2}, {j, 1, h - i -1}]];
If[s ==1, s2 = s2 + 1, s1 = s1 + 1]])
The program for conditional probability is as follows:
weakproba[b0_, c0_, h_, n_]:=(Do[weak[{{i, j, n-i-j},{k, r, n-k-r},
{n-i-k, n-j-r, (i+j+k+r)-n}}, b0, c0, h], {i, 0, n}, {j, 0, n-i}, {k, 0, n-i},
{r, Max[0, n-k-i-j], Min[n-k, n-j]}]; {s1,s2})
Finally the total probability is seen in:
weaktoproba[c00_, h0_, n0_, m_]:=(c0=c00; h=h0; n=n0;
Do[weakproba[{{i, j, m-i-j},{k, r, m-k-r},{m-i-k, m-j-r, (i+j+k+r)-m}},
c0, h, n], {i, 0, m}, {j, 0, m-i}, {k, 0, m-i}, {r, Max[0, m-k-i-j],
Min[m-k, m-j]}]; Print[”total probability”,”:”, N[s1/(s1+s2)])
In the above s1 and s2 respectively represent the numbers of weak axiom being
satisfied and not satisfied.
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